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INTRODUCTION
For thirty-two years under former President Suharto’s New Order regime 
(from 1966–1998), the teaching of Chinese languages in schools was banned 
in Indonesia. During this period of total assimilation, public displays of 
Chinese characters, along with other forms of Chinese cultural expressions, 
were prohibited, allegedly for the sake of national unity. From 1966–69, 
hundreds of Chinese medium schools and Chinese language press were 
closed in Chinese settlements throughout the archipelago, and the formal 
teaching of Chinese languages in Indonesia effectively ceased. As a result, 
the majority of contemporary Chinese Indonesians no longer have the abil-
ity to speak, let alone write in, Chinese.
As has been extensively documented, the situation only changed when, 
after months of economic crisis, political instability and student protests 
demanding the resignation of President Suharto, the chaos culminated in 
large-scale lootings, destruction of properties and rape of ethnic Chinese 
women between 12 and 14 May 1998 in Jakarta, Solo and other major 
cities (see Hoon, 2007; Purdey, 2006). Soon after, the New Order regime 
collapsed and a new era of reform (reformasi) began, with promises of civil 
society, democracy, civil liberties and justice. The post-Suharto sociopoliti-
cal atmosphere could not be more different for the ethnic Chinese, whereby 
almost immediately, subsequent reformasi governments abolished almost all 
assimilationist policies, ushering in a ‘revival’ of Chinese identity (see Hoon, 
2007; Setijadi, 2010). Since 1998, there has been a steady increase in the 
number of Chinese language courses and programs at Indonesian schools 
and universities, particularly in areas with large ethnic Chinese populations.
Indeed, after three decades of assimilation, many Chinese parents—the 
majority of whom do not speak Chinese themselves—want their children to 
learn Chinese in order to ‘reconnect’ to a ‘lost’ Chinese identity. At a more 
pragmatic level, they are also deeply aware of the potential economic advan-
tages of knowing Mandarin for the purposes of their children’s future career 
advancement, trade and guanxi with rapidly rising China. This pragmatism 
is reflected in the overwhelming popularity of Mandarin (particularly the 
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standardised Putonghua variety used as the national language in China) as 
the language to learn, and not regional dialects such as Teochew, Hakka or 
Hokkien, originally spoken by the majority of Chinese migrants in the Indo-
nesian archipelago. The youth themselves seem to embrace learning Man-
darin with many increasingly engaging in code switching between English, 
Mandarin and Indonesian in social interactions. In addition, the ability to 
speak or at least understand Mandarin also enables young Chinese Indone-
sians to further imagine themselves as part of a modern pan-Chinese youth 
identity they see in transnational Mandarin and Cantonese films, TV series 
and pop culture.
Looking at all these trends, the ability to speak Chinese (particularly 
Mandarin) appears to play an important part in the construction of Chinese 
identities in the post-Suharto era. Thus far, however, little is known about 
the linguistic practices and beliefs of contemporary Chinese Indonesians. 
Furthermore, considering that only fifteen years ago, Chinese languages 
and culture were banned, questions also need to be asked regarding how 
the ‘return’ of Chinese languages in public are perceived by Chinese and 
non-Chinese Indonesians. Using ethnographic interviews with twenty-five 
young Chinese Indonesians1 ages 18 to 35 from both genders conducted in 
Jakarta from 2008–2012, this chapter examines how young post-Suharto 
Chinese view their ethnic identity and belonging in relation to their abil-
ity (or inability) to speak Chinese. This chapter also discusses the tensions 
between competing ideologies on ethnicity, nationalism and culture as 
embodied in the daily negotiations of which language(s) to speak and when.
CHINESE INDONESIANS, CHINESENESS AND CHINESE 
LANGUAGES IN INDONESIA
The prohibition of Chinese languages during the New Order period was 
only one example of the many instances of anti-Chinese discrimination 
that had occurred almost consistently throughout the history of Chinese 
settlement in the Indonesian archipelago. Whereas the Chinese had had a 
long history of migration to Indonesia that began in pre-colonial times, the 
Dutch colonial policy of racial segregation successfully perpetuated a nega-
tive image of the Chinese as economically dominant ‘essential outsiders’ 
who did not sympathise with the plight of the native (‘pribumi’ in Indo-
nesian) population (Chirot and Reid, 1997). Throughout the periods of 
Dutch colonialism, independence struggle and the early days of the Indo-
nesian Republic, the Chinese’s belonging and national identity in Indonesia 
remained ambiguous at best, regardless of the fact that many ethnic Chi-
nese were nationalists who supported the independence cause. As Filomeno 
Aguilar, Jr. suggests, in the course of Indonesian nationalist awakening, 
the Chinese were attributed a definite, distant place of origin—China—and 
thus the descendants of Chinese migrants became ‘indelibly linked to the 
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first-generation immigrants and, in an unbroken chain, remained forever 
aliens’ (2001: 517).
Chinese Indonesians themselves were, and always had been, a heteroge-
neous group consisting of people that came from various regions in China, 
spoke different languages (Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese and Teochew being 
the four major spoken languages), held different political views and felt 
varying degrees of belonging towards the Indonesian nation. The traditional 
groupings of Chinese Indonesians as either ‘totok’ (‘pure’ Chinese with no 
mixed ancestry) or ‘peranakan’ (acculturated Chinese, usually with mixed 
Chinese-native Indonesian ancestry) illustrate the different ‘types’ of Chinese 
in Indonesia with different connections to the Chinese homeland, language 
and culture2 (see Coppel, 1983). Unlike the totok Chinese who maintained 
Chinese traditions, culture and language in Indonesia, the peranakan Chi-
nese mostly identified with the cultures of their local regions, spoke local 
languages instead of Chinese and developed their own unique hybrid culture 
from a mixture of Chinese and local cultural influences. Nevertheless, the 
discourse of ‘Masalah Cina’ (the ‘Chinese Problem’) in Indonesia collapsed 
the diversity of ethnic Chinese lives into one alleged problem that needed to 
be ‘fixed’ with a convenient phraseology.
Following the alleged failed communist coup of 30 September 1965 
(G-30S/PKI in the national terminology), in which many ethnic Chinese 
individuals and organisations were implicated, President Suharto’s New 
Order regime ‘took control’ of rising anti-Chinese sentiment with a series 
of assimilationist legislations (see Cribb & Coppel, 2009). In 1966, Cabinet 
Presidium Decision 127 required all ethnic Chinese to discard their Chinese 
names and adopt ‘Indonesian-sounding’ ones. In 1967, Presidential Instruc-
tion Number 14 on Chinese Religion, Beliefs, and Traditions effectively 
banned any Chinese literature and public displays of cultural expression in 
Indonesia, including the prohibition of Chinese characters. Furthermore, 
as part of the ‘Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem’ (Presi-
dential Decision No. 240 of 1967) and other measures, only one heavily 
monitored Chinese-language newspaper was allowed to continue and all 
Chinese language schools were eventually phased out. Buildings and proper-
ties owned by Chinese educational organisations were seized and ‘nation-
alised’ for use by state-run schools. Sai Siew-Min (2010) estimates that, in 
the late 1960s, the ban on Chinese language education affected 629 schools, 
6,478 teachers and 272,782 students in eleven cities across Indonesia.3
The prohibition of Chinese languages throughout the New Order was 
consistent with the prevalent national language ideology at the time that 
viewed the elimination of ‘non-native’ languages such as Chinese as neces-
sary for national unity. Since the beginning of the Indonesian nationalist 
movement in the early twentieth century, the Malay language came to be 
seen as a strong contender as the emerging nation’s lingua franca because 
it was perceived as a common language of the natives (Kahin, 1963). At 
the historic Second Youth Congress on 28 October 1928 when youth 
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delegations from native ethnic groups across the archipelago pledged their 
oath (known from then on as the ‘Youth Oath’) towards a unified Indone-
sian nation, modernised Malay (renamed ‘Indonesian’) was adopted as the 
language of the new nation, privileged above all other native and non-native 
languages. The centrality of Indonesian as the language of national unity 
was evident in its teaching as a compulsory language in schools and as 
the only language of politics, trade and national culture, although the 
government was committed in principle to protecting local languages. 
As non-native languages spoken by a sociopolitically ‘problematic’ eth-
nic minority, the prohibition of Chinese languages was easily justified. In 
this regard, the banning of Chinese reflected the popular view of Chinese 
Indonesians as essentially foreigners within the framework of Indonesia’s 
ethno-nationalist ideology.
Ariel Heryanto (2006) argues that the effect of the assimilation policies 
was the lasting image of Chineseness as ideologically unclean, dangerous, 
shameful and therefore in need of erasure. Connections with China in the 
late 1960s had strong communist connotations, and anyone caught speaking 
in Chinese was viewed with strong suspicion and anger. Chinese languages 
became confined to the private domains, and many parents stopped teach-
ing their children Chinese altogether. Over the three decades of assimila-
tion from 1966 to 1998, Chinese Indonesian language, culture and identity 
were in many ways ‘erased’ or at least hidden from public view, although 
their forced assimilation also had the paradoxical effect of accentuating the 
group’s essential foreignness in the national imagination.
As mentioned before, the end of the New Order marked the beginning 
of a new Chinese identity politics that started with demands for the abo-
lition of assimilationist laws and justice for the victims of the May ’98 
rapes and riots (see Budiman, 2005; Purdey, 2006; Turner, 2003). Indeed, 
post-Suharto governments were only too eager to prove their commitment 
to human rights issues and move away from the harmful legacies of the New 
Order and May 1998 by implementing new laws that recognised the rights 
of Chinese Indonesians. The Habibie government (1998–1999) started off 
these reforms through a Presidential Instruction that abolished the use of the 
terms ‘pribumi’ and ‘non-pribumi’ in official government documents. In the 
year 2000, the newly elected President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001) 
revoked bans against Chinese languages, religion and cultural expressions, 
allowing Chinese culture to be practiced in public once more. President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004) made Imlek (Chinese New Year) a 
national holiday in 2002 as an official gesture of recognition for both Chi-
nese Indonesians and the Confucian (Konghucu) religion that was added as 
one of the state’s six official religions. The stark contrast between the New 
Order and the post-Suharto era led many ethnic Chinese to view the refor-
masi era as a time for the revival of Chinese culture in Indonesia.
One of the most noticeable changes that occurred in the post-Suharto 
era is the return of Chinese languages and script in the public domain. 
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Previously banned, Chinese characters could be seen on posters, banners 
and store decorations, particularly during annual Imlek celebrations. More 
and more, Mandarin and other Chinese languages are being spoken in pub-
lic by Chinese Indonesians who feel that it is now ‘safe’ to speak Chinese in 
front of pribumi Indonesians. Perhaps more significantly, the fall of the New 
Order has seen what Leo Suryadinata calls ‘a watershed for Chinese educa-
tion’ (2008: 4). In the last fifteen years, the demand for Mandarin, particu-
larly among Chinese Indonesian students, has led to language courses being 
offered in many private and public schools, often as part of the National 
Plus curriculum, according to which classes are delivered in a combination 
of Indonesian, English and Mandarin. The number of private Mandarin lan-
guage course providers has also mushroomed in the last decade, especially 
in urban residential areas with large concentrations of middle to upper class 
Chinese Indonesian families (see Kaboel & Sulanti, 2010). On their part, 
the PRC government is clearly encouraging the demand for Mandarin lan-
guage in Indonesia with the opening of seven Confucius Institutes attached 
to universities in major Indonesian cities. Additionally, in the past five years, 
a number of alumni organisations made up of older generation Chinese 
Indonesians who were ex-graduates of Chinese-medium schools, such as 
the disbanded Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (Chinese Association) schools, had 
re-established their pre-Suharto schools with the mission to revive Chinese 
education for post-Suharto youth. Such organisations include the PaHoa 
alumni group that established the PaHoa National Plus School in the outer 
suburbs of Jakarta, the PaChung group that established two schools in 
Jakarta and the MaChung group that established MaChung University in 
Malang, East Java (see Setijadi, 2010).
For many middle- and upper-class Chinese Indonesian families, it makes 
sense to send their children for Mandarin extracurricular lessons or to 
National Plus schools, especially if they plan on sending their children to 
China or Taiwan for language or tertiary education. Indeed, in recent years, 
more and more Chinese Indonesian youth from affluent families go to China 
not only for language study but also for tertiary education degrees. For 
instance, data from the Indonesian embassy in Beijing suggest that whereas 
in 1998, only around 1,000 Indonesian students studied at Chinese uni-
versities, in 2012 the number had risen to over 9,000 (Priyambodo, 2012). 
This is a growing trend away from the dominance of Western countries 
such as Australia, the US and the UK as the common destinations for Indo-
nesian students pursuing overseas education. Whereas non-Chinese Indone-
sian students are included in this figure, a large majority are ethnic Chinese 
youths with hopes of creating a future employment niche for themselves not 
only with an overseas university degree but also knowledge of modern Chi-
nese language and society. Many among them also hope that their Chinese 
ethnicity will increase the possibility of future advantageous guanxi4 con-
nections for career advancement and trade opportunities with China and 
other Chinese-speaking countries.
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‘YOU’RE NOT A REAL CHINESE IF YOU CAN’T SPEAK CHINESE’: 
LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY AND CHINESE INDONESIAN IDENTITY
At the core of this post-Suharto ‘revival’ of Chinese language use and edu-
cation is a belief that Chinese Indonesians must now seize the opportunity 
to re-learn Chinese languages and reclaim a Chinese identity that was lost 
to the generations that grew up under the New Order. The term ‘lost gen-
eration’ has been frequently used by scholars, observers and the Chinese 
Indonesian public more generally to refer to the post-1965 generation who 
never learned Chinese, possess little or no knowledge of Chinese culture 
and had been made to feel ashamed about being Chinese (see Hoon, 2007; 
Suryadinata, 2008). Many of the older, Chinese-educated totok Chinese in 
particular expressed concerns that contemporary young Chinese Indone-
sians do not know their identity and the long, proud history of the Chinese 
people. In an interview, Teddy Jusuf, a former Indonesian Army General 
and prominent Chinese Indonesian elder who himself was Chinese-educated 
in the 1940s, complained that:
The [Chinese] youth today cannot speak Mandarin, do not know Chi-
nese culture, and had become completely dissociated from their family’s 
name and heritage. . . . They do not know who they are. . . . It is the 
job of the older generation to encourage the youth to learn about their 
Chinese identity again. . . . In particular they need to learn Mandarin so 
they can understand the culture. (author’s translation from Indonesian)
In a similar vein, Koko Tanumihardja, a PaHoa alumni and founder of the 
new PaHoa School remarked:
I remember going to school at the old PaHoa school in Patekoan, and 
I also remember the sadness I felt when the government forcibly closed 
the school. . . . Not just our school but also all Chinese schools in Indo-
nesia. It was a tragedy for the Chinese, because without the schools, we 
lost all sense of who we are and the values that set us apart as a people. 
My children for example, can’t speak Mandarin, although I did try to 
instil Chinese moral values as much as I could while they were growing 
up. . . . The younger generation now, they are lucky that they could have 
Chinese education again. . . . Chinese schools like PaHoa need to be 
resurrected so that the younger generation can re-learn what was lost. 
(author’s translation from Indonesian)
Evident in what Pak (Mister) Teddy and Pak Koko said is a common idea 
among Chinese Indonesians that the ability to speak Chinese is intrinsically 
linked to Chinese culture and identity.
The belief in the cultural significance of Chinese language is prevalent 
among Chinese people both in China and in overseas Chinese diaspora 
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around the world. As scholars note time and time again, most Chinese—even 
those who do not speak Chinese themselves—hold the position that without 
the ability to speak Chinese, a Chinese person could never be a ‘complete’ 
Chinese (see Li & Zhu, 2010; Tu, 1991; Wang, 1991). Here, the ability 
to read and write in Chinese is desirable, but a Chinese person should at 
least be able to speak Chinese. For ethnic Chinese living in overseas Chi-
nese diaspora, the issue is arguably even more complicated considering that, 
as Chinese who live in the ‘periphery,’ Chinese languages and culture are 
often preserved with particular zeal as the means by which overseas Chi-
nese (huaqiao) could maintain their connection with China as the mythical 
homeland. In her book On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and 
the West, Ien Ang argues that for ethnic Chinese in diaspora, the inability 
to speak Chinese is ‘a condition that has been hegemonically constructed 
as a lack, a sign of loss of authenticity’ (2001: 30). According to this logic, 
Chinese persons who somehow ‘lost’ the ability to speak Chinese are con-
structed as inauthentic or ‘fake’ Chinese, both by others and by themselves.
Indeed, during interviews with young Chinese Indonesians, this ideol-
ogy about the importance of Chinese language to identity is prevalent and 
would often come up during conversations about how the youth view their 
Chineseness in relation to their ability (or inability) to speak Chinese. For 
example, in an interview with Ben and Fenny, two 30-year-old peranakan 
Chinese, they joked about how they were ‘fake’ Chinese (cina palsu) because 
they did not know how to speak Chinese:
Ben:        It is actually quite funny that the pribumi call me Chi-
nese because actually, a real Chinese person would never 
pass me as a Chinese [laughs].
Interviewer: What do you think makes a real Chinese person?
Ben:        Well, for one, you’d have to be able to speak Chinese, 
which I can’t.
Fenny:      That’s right, I’m a fake Chinese too like Ben [laughs]. 
My grandparents could still speak Chinese [Hakka], but 
my parents were never taught properly and could only 
speak a little bit of Chinese. But my siblings and I, we 
can’t speak any Chinese at all.
Ben:       So your family gets faker and faker [as Chinese] with 
each generation [laughs].
Fenny:     Yeah, you can say that, we got diluted over time! [laughs]
Ben:       Everyone knows that you’re not a real Chinese if you 
can’t speak Chinese.
(author’s translation from Indonesian)
For young people like Ben and Fenny, the experience of realising their status 
as a so-called ‘fake’ Chinese could sometimes be a harsh one, as discovered 
by Alex, a 32-year-old male from a totok Chinese background who felt hurt 
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when he thought that people in mainland China did not regard him as a 
‘real’ Chinese while on a family trip to China:
Growing up, I was always told that I should be proud of being a Chi-
nese, and our family spoke Hokkien at home. I only knew very lit-
tle Mandarin, but when our family went to China for holiday, I tried 
speaking in Mandarin to shopkeepers and when ordering food. . . . But 
the shopkeepers would talk back to me really fast, and I couldn’t under-
stand what they were saying! They just looked at me like they were 
angry at me for not being able to speak proper Chinese. . . . I felt so sad 
because I felt like I didn’t belong there [in China] and that I was not 
a real Chinese. . . . Now I know that other Chinese people, especially 
those in the mainland, don’t regard us Chinese Indonesians as Chinese 
anyway. (author’s translation from Indonesian)
Although Alex’s experience of being regarded as inauthentic is quite com-
mon among overseas Chinese and members of other diaspora, the Chi-
nese Indonesian experience is unique because, feeling like they are neither 
accepted as Indonesian nor Chinese, many Chinese Indonesians are unsure 
about where they belong.
In many ways, being able to speak Chinese carries a particular symbolic 
significance for Chinese Indonesians in the post-Suharto era as they now 
struggle to reclaim what is perceived as a lost Chinese identity. If in the past, 
speaking in Chinese was seen as something shameful and politically danger-
ous, now the tables have turned and being able to speak Chinese is con-
sidered an asset that needs to be acquired quickly. Furthermore, at a time 
when Chinese Indonesians are seeking to redefine their ethnic and national 
identities following more than three decades of assimilation, more and more 
contemporary Chinese from totok and peranakan backgrounds are learning 
Mandarin as a way to forge connection to a pan-Chinese identity. Feeling 
like they could never be regarded as a ‘true’ Indonesian by the pribumi, 
many young Chinese Indonesians are reorienting themselves towards China 
and Chinese culture, and learning Mandarin is often viewed as the most 
effective way to do so.
THE RISE OF CHINA, MANDARIN AND ISSUES IN CONTEXT
One of the most interesting aspects of the post-Suharto return of Chinese 
languages has been the privileging of Mandarin as the language to learn 
among Chinese Indonesian youth. If in the past, the Chinese in Indonesia 
mainly spoke southern Min languages such as Hokkien, Hakka and Teo-
chew, today, the emphasis is on the learning and use of Mandarin as the 
official language spoken in the PRC, Taiwan and Singapore. Regional Chi-
nese languages traditional to Chinese Indonesian families were rendered 
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useless, as they would not give the Chinese Indonesians any advantage in 
terms of education, trade or future career paths. For example, in a group 
interview with Henry, Jimmy and Maria, three university students in their 
early twenties who all studied at the same Mandarin language tuition centre 
in Jakarta, all three participants had similar views about the importance of 
Mandarin in comparison to the original languages spoken by their families:
Interviewer: So what made you guys decide to learn Mandarin?
Henry:     I want to do my Master’s degree maybe in China or Tai-
wan, so I need to learn Mandarin in order to do that.
Maria:      I was just interested in learning because even when I was 
a teenager, I always liked watching Chinese films and 
TV series, so I wanted to learn the language [laughs].
Jimmy:    My parents wanted me to learn Mandarin and I thought 
that it would be a good skill to have too.
Interviewer: So do your parents or grandparents speak Mandarin too?
Jimmy:     No, my family were originally from Kuntien [Ponti-
anak], so they spoke Teochew.
Henry:     My family was from Bangka and at home we still speak 
Khek [Hakka].
Maria:      I think my late grandfather knew Mandarin because he 
went to a Chinese school, but our family spoke Khek. 
I can’t speak Khek though because I never learnt it.
Interviewer:  So how come you are learning Mandarin now and not 
your family’s traditional languages?
Henry:     Because it would be useless to learn Khek [laughs].
Maria:      Yeah [laughs] we wouldn’t be able to use the language 
much, and Khek doesn’t get used much anywhere.
Henry:     And Mandarin is the language for education, business 
and all that so it is useful for us to know Mandarin.
Jimmy:          It [Mandarin] would help us communicate with people 
in China, Singapore, and in other places too. It is going 
to take over English as the global language in the future.
(author’s translation from Indonesian)
As discussed by Li Wei and Zhu Hua (2010), whereas overseas Chinese liv-
ing in diaspora have traditionally been dialect dominant, globalisation and 
the rise of China as a global politico-economic power mean that Manda-
rin is gaining particular prestige among the Chinese diasporas. In the same 
paper, Li and Zhu gave the example that all Cantonese schools for British 
Chinese children in the UK now also teach Mandarin, whereas none of the 
Mandarin schools teach Cantonese.5 The situation is very similar in Indone-
sia, where virtually all of the schools, universities and private course provid-
ers that claim to teach Chinese only teach Mandarin and none of the other 
Chinese languages. Traditional languages such as Hakka, Hokkien and 
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Teochew are only taught and maintained at home, and mainly used to com-
municate among families and networks that originated from the same local 
regions in Indonesia (e.g., Khek is still commonly spoken among the Hakka 
Chinese from Bangka, Hokkien among the Chinese from Medan, etc.). It is 
true that Mandarin had been a dominant language even in pre-assimilation 
Chinese medium schools, such as the THHK or Xinhua schools. However, 
the post-Suharto situation is different in that most Chinese Indonesian fami-
lies no longer spoke their traditional familial languages anymore. As the 
younger ethnic Chinese learn and communicate in Mandarin rather than 
Hakka, Hokkien or other Chinese languages, the concern is that these lan-
guages will eventually ‘die off’ in Indonesia as a result.
Another issue with the teaching of Mandarin in Indonesia is that, because 
the teaching in Mandarin on a large scale is a relatively new phenomenon, 
almost all of the materials used in classes and tuitions are imported from 
China, Taiwan, Singapore or Malaysia. Furthermore, the shortage of good 
quality Mandarin teachers in Indonesia means that Mandarin language 
schools and course providers resort to hiring expatriate teachers from China 
or Taiwan. As one Chinese Indonesian Mandarin language teacher tells me, 
consequently, very little of the teaching materials used in classes relate to the 
culture or everyday lives of Chinese Indonesians. Furthermore, this teacher 
also tells me that because many Mandarin teachers come from China, local 
teachers like him worry that PRC-sanctioned Mandarin pronunciation and 
manner of speaking would be the standard for Chinese Indonesians. Such 
concerns highlight the uncertainties that revolve around the dominance of 
Mandarin and the potential for mainland Chinese ‘cultural imperialism’ 
among Chinese Indonesians in the future.
Voices of apprehension have also come from peranakan Chinese Indone-
sians who feel unrepresented by the recent trend among totok Chinese to 
speak Mandarin and orientate themselves towards China. This kind of view 
is evident in a conversation between Christa, a 34-year-old female from a 
totok background, and David, a 33-year-old from a peranakan background. 
During the joint interview, the two disagreed about the effects of the resini-
fication of totok Chinese Indonesians, which in David’s opinion creates a 
negative stereotype of all ethnic Chinese:
David:     It makes me uncomfortable that, now, a lot of Chinese 
are speaking Mandarin in public.
Interviewer: Why does it make you feel uncomfortable?
David:      Because it creates a bad impression for all Chinese. Can 
you imagine what the pribumi would think when they 
hear a bunch of Chinese people speaking in Chinese? 
I think the Chinese forget that the [May ’98] riots weren’t 
that long ago. . . . Just because now we can speak in Chi-
nese, doesn’t mean that we should be insensitive.
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Christa:      I disagree with you David, I think you’re being unfair. 
The Chinese have every right to speak in Chinese, or in 
whatever language they want to. I can speak Mandarin, 
but that doesn’t mean that I’m any less Indonesian or 
that I’m insensitive to the pribumi.
David:      What I mean is this: I think it doesn’t look good for 
the Chinese to suddenly be all ‘Chinese’ once we were 
allowed to. . . . Doesn’t that just confirm all the things 
the pribumi thought about us as not being Indonesian? 
Besides, my family is peranakan and we never spoke Chi-
nese at home. . . . I see no reason to start doing so now.
(author’s translation from Indonesian)
Reflected in the conversation between Christa and David is the long-standing 
social, cultural and political differences that exist between totok and per-
anakan Chinese. Whereas the totok Chinese in general seem to be embrac-
ing the opportunity to speak Mandarin, many peranakan Chinese like 
David reject it altogether.
Here, although the differences between the two ‘groups’ are not as pro-
nounced as what they used to be prior to assimilation, contemporary Chinese 
Indonesians still differentiate themselves from each other based on the totok/
peranakan distinction, particularly when discussing the reasons for their 
chosen cultural orientations. At the crux of differing totok and peranakan 
attitudes towards China, Chinese culture and language is the reality that, 
even in the post-Suharto era, debates still rage about where the ethnic Chi-
nese are (or should be) located in the greater scheme of Indonesian national 
belonging. In a country where national identity is still very much defined by 
ethno-nationalist ideology, many Chinese and pribumi Indonesians continue 
to view Chinese and Indonesian identities as essentially incompatible. For 
the Chinese, the choice of which language to speak and when is fraught with 
sociopolitical considerations related to the kind of belonging they aspire to.
CODE-SWITCHING AND THE NEGOTIATION OF CHINESE 
INDONESIAN IDENTITIES
Among the young ethnic Chinese who aspire to speak Mandarin, there is 
a recent trend of engaging in the practice of code-switching in everyday 
speech, particularly when they are in the company of other Chinese who 
also aspire to speak Mandarin. Code-switching, or the practice of alternat-
ing between two or more languages during a single speech act, is a fea-
ture of bi- and multilingualism that has been amply researched over the 
past three decades (see Auer, 1988; Milroy & Muysken, 1995). However, 
it is not until relatively recently that scholars started to investigate how 
152 Charlotte Setijadi
bi- and multilingual speakers utilise code-switching as a linguistic strategy 
in the construction of ethnic identity (see Block, 2007; Blommaert, Col-
lins & Slembrouck, 2005; De Fina, 2007). Here, scholars have found that 
the act of code-switching can be transformative for the speakers because it 
allows the speakers to creatively bring together their personal histories and 
social contexts in order to make sense of their multilingual identities (see 
Garcia, 2009; Li, 2011). The result is the creation of new language spaces 
where hybrid identities are negotiated. Language proficiency almost does 
not matter in this regard because the rules and boundaries of code-switching 
continuously change according to the speakers’ life experiences and needs.
For Chinese Indonesian youth who aspire to speak Mandarin, 
code-switching between Indonesian and Mandarin (and sometimes English) 
is a speech strategy that allows them to speak Mandarin, even when they 
only know very few Mandarin sentences or phrases. Such code-switching acts 
usually only occur when the young people are in the presence of other friends 
who also know some Mandarin, or—as was the case during interviews for 
this research—they find themselves in a situation where they feel like they 
need to emphasise their Chineseness. Whereas words from other Chinese 
languages, such as Hokkien, often also get used in code-switching, in recent 
times, Mandarin as the language most young Chinese learn is the language 
most commonly used for code-switching. For example, the following excerpt 
was recorded during a group interview with Ling Ling, Melia and Andri, 
three friends in their early twenties who all spoke beginner level Mandarin:
Interviewer: Jadi kalian bisa ngomong Mandarin?
     (So do you guys speak Mandarin?)
Andri:     [laughs] ya, kalau yi dian dian Zhongwen bisa lah.
      (well, if it is just a little bit of Mandarin then I can do 
a bit.)
Ling:     Ling: Ahhh, gaya si Andri sok bisa, tapi kalau disuruh 
ngomong depan orang pasti dia bù hǎo yìsi! [laughs]
     (Ahhh, Andri is just playing it up, if he has to speak it in 
front of other people then I bet that he’d be embarrassed!)
Interviewer:  Kenapa kok malu kalau ngomong Mandarin di depan 
orang lain Andri?
     (Why do you get embarrassed if you have to speak Man-
darin in front of other people Andri?)
Andri:     Karena gue cuma tau dikit-dikit tapi sok tau [laughs].
    (Because I only know a bit but I pretend to know a lot.)
Melia:     Iya terus abis itu dia panik kalau diajak ngomong yang 
susah, dia wo bù zhǎdào lah, wo bù zhǎdào!
     (Yes but then he panics when someone then starts talk-
ing complicated [Mandarin] to him, he’ll go I don’t 
know, I don’t know!)
sample: (author’s translation from Jakartan dialect 
Indonesian and Mandarin)
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Neither Ling Ling, Andri or Melia came from Mandarin-speaking fami-
lies and, like so many other post-Suharto Chinese youth, they only started 
learning and speaking Mandarin at their private schools during compul-
sory Mandarin language classes. Initially uninterested by the language, they 
became more motivated users of Mandarin during their university years 
when they realised its potential usefulness. Here, code-switching is not only 
a way for friends to practice their limited Mandarin with one another; it is 
also a way to reaffirm each other’s Chineseness. As Andri claimed during the 
interview, ‘it is nice to be able to speak in a language of the Chinese people’ 
(author’s translation from Indonesian).
Indeed, one of the most common situations in which the Chinese youth 
I observed code-switched with one another was when they wanted to say 
something to each other without wanting the pribumi to understand what 
they were saying. For instance, Ling Ling, who admits to frequently using 
Mandarin words or sentences when speaking with her ethnic Chinese friends 
said, ‘I like being able to speak Mandarin because that means that I can speak 
in Mandarin with my friends without the fǎnguì6 understanding what we’re 
saying. . . . It is like having a secret language’ (author’s translation from Indone-
sian). Asked whether she ever gets worried about whether the pribumi would 
get offended when she speaks in Mandarin near them, Ling Ling answered:
Well, I guess so, there was this one time that my friend and I were speak-
ing in Mandarin, and then this [pribumi] man told us off and said that 
we should speak Indonesian because we’re in Indonesia. . . . But I think 
that’s not fair because we have the right to speak our own language 
now. . . . The pribumi themselves also have languages that we don’t 
understand like Sundanese or Batakese, so why shouldn’t we be able to 
speak our own language? (author’s translation from Indonesian)
A number of other young Chinese interviewed shared the same opinion as 
Ling Ling, with Singapore or Malaysia often cited as positive examples of 
Southeast Asian countries where Chinese could coexist with other languages 
like Malay, Hindi and English in the public domain. However, as is the case 
with many other sociocultural aspects of Chinese Indonesian lives, the issue 
of language choice is complex and laden with uncertainties about how much 
Chinese is acceptable in public. For now, the increasing use of code-switching 
among young people indicates that many contemporary Chinese Indonesians 
are experimenting with Mandarin as a means of identification. Consequently, 
as new spaces for identity expression are created, the meanings and boundar-
ies of Chineseness in Indonesia are also continuously being redefined.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have presented the case of Mandarin language learning 
and use among young Chinese Indonesians in the post-Suharto era. At a 
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time when Chinese Indonesians are free to ‘be Chinese’ again, learning and 
speaking Mandarin has become one of the most important ways in which 
Chinese identities are expressed. The demand for Mandarin is evident in 
the large number of schools, universities and private course providers that 
started offering Mandarin language teaching in recent years, and the num-
ber of Indonesian tertiary and language students in the PRC and Taiwan is 
presently at an all-time high. Here, motivations for learning Mandarin vary 
from the sentimental (e.g., wanting to reconnect to a ‘lost’ Chinese iden-
tity) to the pragmatic (e.g., wanting to keep up with the rise of China and 
tap into the potential for guanxi). Regardless of their motivation, however, 
one defining feature of Chinese Indonesians currently learning or speaking 
Mandarin is a sense of renewed pride in their Chinese ethnicity where, for 
the first time in a long time, Chineseness is seen as an asset and no longer 
a sociopolitical liability. Speaking Chinese in public is seen as increasingly 
acceptable, and more and more young Chinese Indonesians are engaging in 
code-switching between Indonesian and Mandarin in everyday speech with 
each other.
Nevertheless, there are pertinent issues associated with the return of Chi-
nese languages in post-Suharto Indonesia. For one, the vastly popular pref-
erence for Mandarin as the language to learn and speak among the young 
people means that regional languages such as Hokkien and Hakka tradition-
ally spoken by Chinese families are under the threat of eventually becoming 
extinct in Indonesia. This privileging of Mandarin above regional Chinese 
languages is consistent with the trend seen in other Chinese diaspora world-
wide, where the promotion of Mandarin as the official language of the PRC 
has increased its authenticity, prestige and demand among overseas Chinese 
(see Gao, 2012; Li & Zhu, 2010). From a theoretical point of view, the fact 
that many Chinese Indonesian families are encouraging their young to learn 
Mandarin as a way to reconnect to a ‘lost’ Chinese identity even though 
their ancestors never spoke Mandarin highlights the constructed nature of 
language ideology and ethnic identity. Furthermore, the return of Chinese 
languages in the public domain raises questions about how this process 
of resinification is perceived, not just by pribumi Indonesians, but also by 
ethnic Chinese who feel uncomfortable about the trend. As discussed in 
this chapter, many Chinese Indonesians from peranakan backgrounds had 
always felt wholly Indonesian and thus consider the recent move to speak 
Mandarin and reorient towards China to be unrepresentative of the per-
anakan sociocultural heritage. Some of these Chinese Indonesians also feel 
anxious about the potentially harmful effects of post-Suharto resinification 
on the already fragile political image of the Chinese in Indonesia.
Issues surrounding the politics of language among ethnic Chinese in 
the post-Suharto era are intrinsically linked to the long-standing Chinese 
‘problem’ in Indonesia. For contemporary Chinese Indonesians, choosing 
which language(s) to speak and when is not a simple matter, and the deci-
sion whether to speak Chinese or not is ultimately a statement of individu-
als’ sense of ethnic and national belonging. For now, however, recent trends 
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suggest that Mandarin will continue to gain popularity among younger Chi-
nese Indonesians, particularly as China gains more international prominence 
politically, economically and culturally. As Mandarin becomes more widely 
spoken among Chinese Indonesians, the characteristics and boundaries of 
Chineseness in Indonesia will continue to be redefined. As such, more criti-
cal reflections are needed in the future in order for scholars to analyse what 
these changes mean, both for Chinese Indonesian identity politics and the 
study of language politics in Chinese diasporas.
NOTES
 1. The names of research respondents have been changed in order to protect 
their anonymity.
 2. ‘Totok’ Chinese are generally regarded as less intermingled with the local com-
munities and still very much culturally orientated towards China. The term 
‘peranakan’ on the other hand generally refers to the Chinese who have lived 
in Indonesia for centuries—in many cases even of mixed ancestry—and have 
intermingled with local cultures. Such distinction should only be seen as a 
common and convenient way to differentiate between totok and peranakan as, 
even within these two groups, the Chinese were far from unified and most of 
their political decisions were motivated by pragmatism and self-preservation. 
Scholars now generally regard the totok-peranakan distinction to be outdated, 
but the terms are still frequently used by Chinese Indonesians when referring 
to the degrees to which their families adhere to Chinese cultural traditions (see 
Hoon, 2007; Tsai, 2008).
 3. These figures were official statistics released by the Education Ministry. For 
in-depth accounts and analyses of events leading to the language ban, see Cop-
pel (1983).
 4. Guanxi (pronounced kuan-shi) literally means ‘relation’ or ‘relationship’ as a 
noun, and ‘relate to’ as a verb, although as commonly used in contemporary 
Chinese society it refers more narrowly to ‘particularistic ties’ (Jacobs, 1980). 
According to Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie and David Wank, these relations 
are based on ascribed or primordial traits such as kinship, native places and 
ethnicity, and also on acquired characteristics such as attending the same 
school, serving in the same military unit and doing business together (2002: 
6). Because of the emphasis on primordial traits, it is generally understood 
among the Chinese (both in pan-Chinese countries and in the diaspora) that 
their shared ethnicity means that they will benefit from mutual preferential 
treatment when dealing with each other (see Ong, 1999).
 5. The promotion of Mandarin at the expense of regional languages has been 
well noted in recent sociolinguistic research. For more on the topic, along with 
examples from other Chinese-speaking counties and communities, see Gao 
(2012), Tan (2006) and Wang & Ladegaard (2008).
 6. ‘Fa¯nguì’ is a Mandarin term meaning ‘dark foreigner’ and it is a derogatory 
term often used by Chinese Indonesians to describe the pribumi.
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